- Explore how a single command can turn any open-source repo into an AI agent backdoor.
Just two months ago, researchers at the Data Intelligence Lab at the University of Hong Kong introduced CLI-Anything, a new state-of-the-art tool that analyzes any repo’s source code and generates a structured command line interface (CLI) that AI coding agents can operate with a single command.
Claude Code, Codex, OpenClaw, Cursor, and GitHub Copilot CLI are all supported, and since its launch in March, CLI‑Anything has climbed to more than 30,000 GitHub stars.
But the same mechanism that makes software agent-native opens the door to agent-level poisoning. The attack community is already discussing the implications on X and security forums, translating CLI-Anything's architecture into offensive playbooks.
The security problem is not what CLI-Anything does. It is what CLI-Anything represents.
CLI-Anything generates SKILL.md files, the same instruction-layer artifacts that Snyk’s ToxicSkills research found laced with 76 confirmed malicious payloads across ClawHub and skills.sh in February 2026. A poisoned skill definition does not trigger a CVE and never appears in a software bill of materials (SBOM). No mainstream security scanner has a detection category for malicious instructions embedded in agent skill definitions, because the category simply did not exist eighteen months ago.
Cisco confirmed the gap in April. “Traditional application security tools were not designed for this,” Cisco’s engineering team wrote in a blog post announcing its AI Agent Security Scanner for IDEs. “SAST [static application security testing] scanners analyze source code syntax. SCA [software composition analysis] tools check dependency versions. Neither understands the semantic layer where MCP [Model Context Protocol] tool descriptions, agent prompts, and skill definitions operate.”
Merritt Baer, CSO of Enkrypt AI and former Deputy CISO at Amazon Web Services (AWS), told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview: “SAST and SCA were built for code and dependencies. They don’t inspect instructions.”
This is not a single-vendor vulnerability. It is a structural gap in how the entire security industry monitors software supply chains. This is the pre-exploitation window. CLI-Anything is live, the attack community is discussing it, and security directors who act now get ahead of the first incident report.
The integration layer no stack can see
Traditional supply-chain security operates on two layers. The code layer is where SAST works, scanning source files for insecure patterns, injection flaws, and hardcoded secrets. The dependency layer is where SCA works, checking package versions against known vulnerabilities, generating SBOMs, and flagging outdated libraries.
Agent bridge tools like CLI-Anything, MCP connectors, Cursor rules files, and Claude Code skills operate on a third layer between the other two. Call it the agent integration layer: configuration files, skill definitions, and natural-language instruction sets tell an AI agent what software can do and how to operate it. None of it looks like code. All of it executes like code.
Carter Rees, VP of AI at Reputation, told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview: “Modern LLMs [large language models] rely on third-party plugins, introducing supply chain vulnerabilities where compromised tools can inject malicious data into the conversation flow, bypassing internal safety training.”
Researchers at Griffith University, Nanyang Technological University, the University of New South Wales, and the University of Tokyo documented the attack chain in an April paper, “Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems.” The team introduced Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), a technique that embeds malicious logic inside code examples within skill documentation.
Across four agent frameworks and five large language models, DDIPE achieved bypass rates between 11.6% and 33.5%. Static analysis caught most samples, but 2.5% evaded all four detection layers. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two vendor fixes.
The kill chain security leaders need to audit
Here's the anatomy of the kill chain: An attacker submits a SKILL.md file to an open-source project containing setup instructions, code examples, and configuration templates. It looks like standard documentation. A code reviewer would wave it through because none of it is executable. But the code examples contain embedded instructions that an agent will parse as operational directives.
A developer uses an agent bridge tool to connect their coding agent to the repository. The agent ingests the skill definition and trusts it, because no verification layer exists to distinguish benign from malicious intent at the instruction level.
The agent executes the embedded instruction using its own legitimate credentials. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) sees an approved API call from an authorized process and passes it. Data exfiltration, configuration changes, and credential harvesting are all moving through channels that the monitoring stack considers normal traffic.
Rees identified the structural flaw that makes this chain lethal. “A significant vulnerability in enterprise AI is broken access control, where the flat authorization plane of an LLM fails to respect user permissions,” he told VentureBeat. A compromised skill definition riding that flat authorization plane does not need to escalate privileges. It already has them. Every link in that chain is invisible to the current security stack.
Pillar Security demonstrated a variant of this chain against Cursor in January 2026 (CVE-2026-22708). Implicitly trusted shell built-in commands could be poisoned through indirect prompt injection, converting benign developer commands into arbitrary code execution vectors. Users saw only the final command. The poisoning happened through other commands the IDE never surfaced for approval.
The evidence is already in production
In a documented attack chain from April 2026, a crafted GitHub issue title triggered an AI triage bot wired into Cline. The bot exfiltrated a GITHUB_TOKEN, which the attacker used to publish a compromised npm dependency that installed a second agent on roughly 4,000 developer machines for eight hours. There was just one issue title. Attackers had eight hours of access. No human approved the action.
Snyk’s ToxicSkills audit scanned 3,984 agent skills from ClawHub, the public marketplace for the OpenClaw agent framework, and skills.sh in February 2026. The results: 13.4% of all skills contained at least one critical security issue. Daily skill submissions jumped from less than 50 in mid-January to more than 500 by early February. The barrier to publishing was a SKILL.md markdown file and a GitHub account one week old. No code signing. No security review. No sandbox.
OpenClaw is not an outlier. It is the pattern. “The bar to entry is extremely low,” Baer said. “Adding a skill can be as simple as uploading a Word doc or lightweight config file. That’s a radically different risk profile than compiled code.” She pointed to projects like ClawPatrol that have started cataloging and scanning for malicious skills, evidence the ecosystem is moving faster than enterprise defenses.
The ClawHavoc campaign, first reported by Koi Security in late January 2026, initially identified 341 malicious skills on ClawHub. A follow-up analysis by Antiy CERT expanded the count to 1,184 compromised packages across the platform. The campaign delivered Atomic Stealer (AMOS) through skill definitions with professional documentation. Skills named solana-wallet-tracker and polymarket-trader matched what developers actively searched for.
The MCP protocol layer carries similar exposure. OX Security reported in April that researchers poisoned nine out of 11 MCP marketplaces using proof-of-concept servers. Trend Micro initially found 492 MCP servers exposed to the internet with zero authentication; by April, that number had grown to 1,467. As The Register reported, the root issue lies in Anthropic’s MCP software development kit (SDK) transport mechanism. Any developer using the official SDK inherits the vulnerability class.
VentureBeat Prescriptive Matrix: Three-layer agent supply-chain audit
VentureBeat developed a Prescriptive Matrix by mapping the three attack layers documented in the research and incident reports above against the detection capabilities of current SAST, SCA, and agent-layer tools. Each row identifies what security teams should verify and where no scanner has coverage today.
Layer
Threat
Current detection
Why it misses
Recommended action
1. Code
Prompt injection in AI-generated code
SAST scanners
Most SAST tools have no detection category for prompt injection in AI-generated code
Confirm that SAST scans AI-generated code for prompt injection. If not, have an open vendor conversation this quarter.
2. Dependencies
Malicious MCP servers, agent skills, plugin registries
SCA tools
SCA generates no AI-specific bill of materials. Agent-layer dependencies are invisible.
Confirm SCA includes MCP servers, agent skills, and plugin registries in the dependency inventory.
3. Agent integration
Poisoned SKILL.md files, malicious instruction sets, adversarial rules files
None until April 2026
No tool inspects the semantic meaning of agent instruction files. Baer: “We’re not inspecting intent.”
Deploy Cisco Skill Scanner or Snyk mcp-scan. Assign a team to own this layer.
Baer’s diagnosis of Layer 3 applies across the entire matrix: “Current scanners look for known bad artifacts, not adversarial instructions embedded in otherwise valid skills.” Cisco’s open-source Skill Scanner and Snyk’s mcp-scan represent the first tools purpose-built for this layer.
Security director action plan
Here's how security leaders can get ahead of the problem.
Inventory every agent bridge tool in the environment. This includes CLI-Anything, MCP connectors, Cursor rules files, Claude Code skills, GitHub Copilot extensions. If the development team is using agent bridge tools that have not been inventoried, the risk cannot be assessed.
Audit agent skill sources the same way package registries get audited. Baer’s framing is precise: “A skill is effectively untrusted executable intent, even if it’s just text.” Shut off ungoverned ingestion paths until controls are in place. Stand up a review and allowlisting process for skills. The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST01: Malicious Skills) provides the procurement framework to align controls against.
Deploy agent-layer scanning. Evaluate Cisco’s open-source Skill Scanner and Snyk’s mcp-scan for behavioral analysis of agent instruction files. If dedicated tooling is unavailable, require a second engineer to read every SKILL.md before installation.
Restrict agent execution privileges and instrument runtime. AI coding agents should not run with the same credential scope as the developer who invoked them. Rees confirmed the structural flaw: The flat authorization plane means a compromised skill does not need to escalate privileges. Baer’s prescription: “Instrument runtime observability. What data is the agent accessing, what actions is it taking, and are those aligned with expected behavior?”
Assign ownership for the gap between layers. The most dangerous attacks succeed because they fall between detection categories. Assign a team to own the agent integration layer. Review every SKILL.md, MCP config, and rules file before it enters the environment.
The gap that already has a name
Baer underscored the dangers of this new attack vector. “This feels very similar to early container security, but we’re still in the ‘we’ll get to it’ phase across most orgs," she said. She added that, at AWS, it took a few high-profile wake-up calls before container security became table stakes. The difference this time is speed. “There’s no build pipeline, no compilation barrier. Just content," she said.
CLI-Anything is not the threat. It is the proof case that the agent integration layer exists, that it is growing fast, and that the attacker community has already found it. The 33,000 developers who starred the repository are telling security teams where software development is heading. Eighteen months ago, the detection category for agent-integration-layer poisoning did not exist. Cisco and Snyk shipped the first tools for it in April. The window between those two facts is closing. Security directors who have not begun inventory are already behind.
- AI agents leak secrets when credential security is overlooked
On March 30, BeyondTrust proved that a crafted GitHub branch name could steal Codex’s OAuth token in cleartext. OpenAI classified it Critical P1. Two days later, Anthropic’s Claude Code source code spilled onto the public npm registry, and within hours, Adversa found Claude Code silently ignored its own deny rules once a command exceeded 50 subcommands. These were not isolated bugs. They were the latest in a nine-month run: six research teams disclosed exploits against Codex, Claude Code, Copilot, and Vertex AI, and every exploit followed the same pattern. An AI coding agent held a credential, executed an action, and authenticated to a production system without a human session anchoring the request.
The attack surface was first demonstrated at Black Hat USA 2025, when Zenity CTO Michael Bargury hijacked ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot Studio, Google Gemini, Salesforce Einstein and Cursor with Jira MCP on stage with zero clicks. Nine months later, those credentials are what attackers reached.
Merritt Baer, CSO at Enkrypt AI and former Deputy CISO at AWS, named the failure in an exclusive VentureBeat interview. “Enterprises believe they’ve ‘approved’ AI vendors, but what they’ve actually approved is an interface, not the underlying system.” The credentials underneath the interface are the breach.
Codex, where a branch name stole GitHub tokens
BeyondTrust researcher Tyler Jespersen, with Fletcher Davis and Simon Stewart, found Codex cloned repositories using a GitHub OAuth token embedded in the git remote URL. During cloning, the branch name parameter flowed unsanitized into the setup script. A semicolon and a backtick subshell turned the branch name into an exfiltration payload.
Stewart added the stealth. By appending 94 Ideographic Space characters (Unicode U+3000) after “main,” the malicious branch looked identical to the standard main branch in the Codex web portal. A developer sees “main.” The shell sees curl exfiltrating their token. OpenAI classified it Critical P1 and shipped full remediation by February 5, 2026.
Claude Code, where two CVEs and a 50-subcommand bypass broke the sandbox
CVE-2026-25723 hit Claude Code’s file-write restrictions. Piped sed and echo commands escaped the project sandbox because command chaining was not validated. Patched in 2.0.55. CVE-2026-33068 was subtler. Claude Code resolved permission modes from .claude/settings.json before showing the workspace trust dialog. A malicious repo set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions. The trust prompt never appeared. Patched in 2.1.53.
The 50-subcommand bypass landed last. Adversa found that Claude Code silently dropped deny-rule enforcement once a command exceeded 50 subcommands. Anthropic’s engineers had traded security for speed and stopped checking after the fiftieth. Patched in 2.1.90.
“A significant vulnerability in enterprise AI is broken access control, where the flat authorization plane of an LLM fails to respect user permissions,” wrote Carter Rees, VP of AI and Machine Learning at Reputation and a member of the Utah AI Commission. The repository decided what permissions the agent had. The token budget decided which deny rules survived.
Copilot, where a pull request description and a GitHub issue both became root
Johann Rehberger demonstrated CVE-2025-53773 against GitHub Copilot with Markus Vervier of Persistent Security as co-discoverer. Hidden instructions in PR descriptions triggered Copilot to flip auto-approve mode in .vscode/settings.json. That disabled all confirmations and granted unrestricted shell execution across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Microsoft patched it in the August 2025 Patch Tuesday release.
Then, Orca Security cracked Copilot inside GitHub Codespaces. Hidden instructions in a GitHub issue manipulated Copilot into checking out a malicious PR with a symbolic link to /workspaces/.codespaces/shared/user-secrets-envs.json. A crafted JSON $schema URL exfiltrated the privileged GITHUB_TOKEN. Full repository takeover. Zero user interaction beyond opening the issue.
Mike Riemer, CTO at Ivanti, framed the speed dimension in a VentureBeat interview: “Threat actors are reverse engineering patches within 72 hours. If a customer doesn’t patch within 72 hours of release, they’re open to exploit.” Agents compress that window to seconds.
Vertex AI, where default scopes reached Gmail, Drive and Google’s own supply chain
Unit 42 researcher Ofir Shaty found that the default Google service identity attached to every Vertex AI agent had excessive permissions. Stolen P4SA credentials granted unrestricted read access to every Cloud Storage bucket in the project and reached restricted, Google-owned Artifact Registry repositories at the core of the Vertex AI Reasoning Engine. Shaty described the compromised P4SA as functioning like a "double agent," with access to both user data and Google's own infrastructure.
VentureBeat defense grid
Security requirement
Defense shipped
Exploit path
The gap
Sandbox AI agent execution
Codex runs tasks in cloud containers; token scrubbed during agent runtime.
Token present during cloning. Branch-name command injection executed before cleanup.
No input sanitization on container setup parameters.
Restrict file system access
Claude Code sandboxes writes via accept-edits mode.
Piped sed/echo escaped sandbox (CVE-2026-25723). Settings.json bypassed trust dialog (CVE-2026-33068). 50-subcommand chain dropped deny-rule enforcement.
Command chaining not validated. Settings loaded before trust. Deny rules truncated for performance.
Block prompt injection in code context
Copilot filters PR descriptions for known injection patterns.
Hidden injections in PRs, README files, and GitHub issues triggered RCE (CVE-2025-53773 + Orca RoguePilot).
Static pattern matching loses to embedded prompts in legitimate review and Codespaces flows.
Scope agent credentials to least privilege
Vertex AI Agent Engine uses P4SA service agent with OAuth scopes.
Default scopes reached Gmail, Calendar, Drive. P4SA credentials read every Cloud Storage bucket and Google’s Artifact Registry.
OAuth scopes non-editable by default. Least privilege violated by design.
Inventory and govern agent identities
No major AI coding agent vendor ships agent identity discovery or lifecycle management.
Not attempted. Enterprises do not inventory AI coding agents, their credentials, or their permission scopes.
AI coding agents are invisible to IAM, CMDB, and asset inventory. Zero governance exists.
Detect credential exfiltration from agent runtime
Codex obscures tokens in web portal view. Claude Code logs subcommands.
Tokens visible in cleartext inside containers. Unicode obfuscation hid exfil payloads. Subcommand chaining hid intent.
No runtime monitoring of agent network calls. Log truncation hid the bypass.
Audit AI-generated code for security flaws
Anthropic launched Claude Code Security (Feb 2026). OpenAI launched Codex Security (March 2026).
Both scan generated code. Neither scans the agent’s own execution environment or credential handling.
Code-output security is not agent-runtime security. The agent itself is the attack surface.
Every exploit targeted runtime credentials, not model output
Every vendor shipped a defense. Every defense was bypassed.
The Sonar 2026 State of Code Developer Survey found 25% of developers use AI agents regularly, and 64% have started using them. Veracode tested more than 100 LLMs and found 45% of generated code samples introduced OWASP Top 10 flaws, a separate failure that compounds the runtime credential gap.
CrowdStrike CTO Elia Zaitsev framed the rule in an exclusive VentureBeat interview at RSAC 2026: collapse agent identities back to the human, because an agent acting on your behalf should never have more privileges than you do. Codex held a GitHub OAuth token scoped to every repository the developer authorized. Vertex AI’s P4SA read every Cloud Storage bucket in the project. Claude Code traded deny-rule enforcement for token budget.
Kayne McGladrey, an IEEE Senior Member who advises enterprises on identity risk, made the same diagnosis in an exclusive interview with VentureBeat. "It uses far more permissions than it should have, more than a human would, because of the speed of scale and intent."
Riemer drew the operational line in an exclusive VentureBeat interview. "It becomes, I don't know you until I validate you." The branch name talked to the shell before validation. The GitHub issue talked to Copilot before anyone read it.
Security director action plan
Inventory every AI coding agent (CIEM). Codex, Claude Code, Copilot, Cursor, Gemini Code Assist, Windsurf. List the credentials and OAuth scopes each received at setup. If your CMDB has no category for AI agent identities, create one.
Audit OAuth scopes and patch levels. Upgrade Claude Code to 2.1.90 or later. Verify Copilot's August 2025 patch. Migrate Vertex AI to the bring-your-own-service-account model.
Treat branch names, pull request descriptions, GitHub issues, and repo configuration as untrusted input. Monitor for Unicode obfuscation (U+3000), command chaining over 50 subcommands, and changes to .vscode/settings.json or .claude/settings.json that flip permission modes.
Govern agent identities the way you govern human privileged identities (PAM/IGA). Credential rotation. Least-privilege scoping. Separation of duties between the agent that writes code and the agent that deploys it. CyberArk, Delinea, and any PAM platform that accepts non-human identities can onboard agent OAuth credentials today; Gravitee's 2026 survey found only 21.9% of teams have done it.
Validate before you communicate. "As long as we trust and we check and we validate, I'm fine with letting AI maintain it," Riemer said. Before any AI coding agent authenticates to GitHub, Gmail, or an internal repository, verify the agent's identity, scope, and the human session it is bound to.
Ask each vendor in writing before your next renewal. "Show me the identity lifecycle management controls for the AI agent running in my environment, including credential scope, rotation policy, and permission audit trail." If the vendor cannot answer, that is the audit finding.
The governance gap in three sentences
Most CISOs inventory every human identity and have zero inventory of the AI agents running with equivalent credentials. No IAM framework governs human privilege escalation and agent privilege escalation with the same rigor. Most scanners track every CVE but cannot alert when a branch name exfiltrates a GitHub token through a container that developers trust by default.
Zaitsev's advice to RSAC 2026 attendees was blunt: you already know what to do. Agents just made the cost of not doing it catastrophic.
- RSAC 2026 revealed five agent identity frameworks and three blind spots
“You can deceive, manipulate, and lie. That’s an inherent property of language. It’s a feature, not a flaw,” CrowdStrike CTO Elia Zaitsev told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview at RSA Conference 2026. If deception is baked into language itself, every vendor trying to secure AI agents by analyzing their intent is chasing a problem that cannot be conclusively solved. Zaitsev is betting on context instead. CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor walks the process tree on an endpoint and tracks what agents did, not what agents appeared to intend. “Observing actual kinetic actions is a structured, solvable problem,” Zaitsev told VentureBeat. “Intent is not.”
That argument landed 24 hours after CrowdStrike CEO George Kurtz disclosed two production incidents at Fortune 50 companies. In the first, a CEO's AI agent rewrote the company's own security policy — not because it was compromised, but because it wanted to fix a problem, lacked the permissions to do so, and removed the restriction itself. Every identity check passed; the company caught the modification by accident. The second incident involved a 100-agent Slack swarm that delegated a code fix between agents with no human approval. Agent 12 made the commit. The team discovered it after the fact.
Two incidents at two Fortune 50 companies. Caught by accident both times. Every identity framework that shipped at RSAC this week missed them. The vendors verified who the agent was. None of them tracked what the agent did.
The urgency behind every framework launch reflects a broader market shift. "The difficulty of securing agentic AI is likely to push customers toward trusted platform vendors that can offer broader coverage across the expanding attack surface," according to William Blair's RSA Conference 2026 equity research report by analyst Jonathan Ho. Five vendors answered that call at RSAC this week. None of them answered it completely.
Attackers are already inside enterprise pilots
The scale of the exposure is already visible in production data. CrowdStrike's Falcon sensors detect more than 1,800 distinct AI applications across the company's customer fleet, generating 160 million unique instances on enterprise endpoints. Cisco found that 85% of its enterprise customers surveyed have pilot agent programs; only 5% have moved to production, meaning the vast majority of these agents are running without the governance structures production deployments typically require. "The biggest impediment to scaled adoption in enterprises for business-critical tasks is establishing a sufficient amount of trust," Cisco President and Chief Product Officer Jeetu Patel told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview at RSA Conference 2026. "Delegating versus trusted delegating of tasks to agents. The difference between those two, one leads to bankruptcy and the other leads to market dominance."
Etay Maor, VP of Threat Intelligence at Cato Networks, ran a live Censys scan during an exclusive VentureBeat interview at RSA Conference 2026 and counted nearly 500,000 internet-facing OpenClaw instances. The week before: 230,000. Cato CTRL senior researcher Vitaly Simonovich documented a BreachForums listing from February 22, 2026, published on the Cato CTRL blog on February 25, where a threat actor advertised root shell access to a UK CEO’s computer for $25,000 in cryptocurrency. The selling point was the CEO’s OpenClaw AI personal assistant, which had accumulated the company’s production database, Telegram bot tokens, and Trading 212 API keys in plain-text Markdown with no encryption at rest. “Your AI? It’s my AI now. It’s an assistant for the attacker,” Maor told VentureBeat.
The exposure data from multiple independent researchers tells the same story. Bitsight found more than 30,000 OpenClaw instances exposed to the public internet between January 27 and February 8, 2026. SecurityScorecard identified 15,200 of those instances as vulnerable to remote code execution through three high-severity CVEs, the worst rated CVSS 8.8. Koi Security found 824 malicious skills on ClawHub — 335 of them tied to ClawHavoc, which Kurtz flagged in his keynote as the first major supply chain attack on an AI agent ecosystem.
Five vendors, three gaps none of them closed
Cisco went deepest on identity governance. Duo Agentic Identity registers agents as distinct identity objects mapped to human owners, and every tool call routes through an MCP gateway in Secure Access SSE. Cisco Identity Intelligence catches shadow agents by monitoring network traffic rather than authentication logs. Patel told VentureBeat that today’s agents behave “more like teenagers — supremely intelligent, but with no fear of consequence, easily sidetracked or influenced.” CrowdStrike made the biggest philosophical bet, treating agents as endpoint telemetry and tracking the kinetic layer through Falcon’s process-tree lineage. CrowdStrike expanded AIDR to cover Microsoft Copilot Studio agents and shipped Shadow SaaS and AI Agent Discovery across Copilot, Salesforce Agentforce, ChatGPT Enterprise, and OpenAI Enterprise GPT.
Palo Alto Networks built Prisma AIRS 3.0 with an agentic registry, an agentic IDP, and an MCP gateway for runtime traffic control. Palo Alto Networks’ pending Koi acquisition adds supply chain and runtime visibility. Microsoft spread governance across Entra, Purview, Sentinel, and Defender, with Microsoft Sentinel embedding MCP natively and a Claude MCP connector in public preview April 1. Cato CTRL delivered the adversarial proof that the identity gaps the other four vendors are trying to close are already being exploited. Maor told VentureBeat that enterprises abandoned basic security principles when deploying agents. “We just gave these AI tools complete autonomy,” Maor said.
Gap 1: Agents can rewrite the rules governing their own behavior
The Kurtz incident illustrates the gap exactly. Every credential check passed — the action was authorized. Zaitsev argues that the only reliable detection happens at the kinetic layer: which file was modified, by what process, initiated by what agent, compared against a behavioral baseline. Intent-based controls evaluate whether the call looks malicious. This one did not. Palo Alto Networks offers pre-deployment red teaming in Prisma AIRS 3.0, but red teaming runs before deployment, not during runtime when self-modification happens. No vendor ships behavioral anomaly detection for policy-modifying actions as a production capability.
Patel framed the stakes in the VentureBeat interview: “The agent takes the wrong action and worse yet, some of those actions might be critical actions that are not reversible.” Board question: An authorized agent modifies the policy governing the agent’s future actions. What fires?
Gap 2: Agent-to-agent handoffs have no trust verification
The 100-agent swarm is the proof point. Agent A found a defect and posted to Slack. Agent 12 executed the fix. No human approved the delegation. Zaitsev’s approach: collapse agent identities back to the human. An agent acting on your behalf should never have more privileges than you do. But no product follows the delegation chain between agents. IAM was built for human-to-system. Agent-to-agent delegation needs a trust primitive that does not exist in OAuth, SAML, or MCP.
Gap 3: Ghost agents hold live credentials with no offboarding
Organizations adopt AI tools, run a pilot, lose interest, and move on. The agents keep running. The credentials stay active. Maor calls these abandoned instances ghost agents. Zaitsev connected ghost agents to a broader failure: agents expose where enterprises delayed action on basic identity hygiene. Standing privileged accounts, long-lived credentials, and missing offboarding procedures. These problems existed for humans. Agents running at machine speed make the consequences catastrophic.
Maor demonstrated a Living Off the AI attack at the RSA Conference 2026, chaining Atlassian’s MCP and Jira Service Management to show that attackers do not separate trusted tools, services, and models. Attackers chain all three. “We need an HR view of agents,” Maor told VentureBeat. “Onboarding, monitoring, offboarding. If there’s no business justification? Removal.”
Why these three gaps resist a product fix
Human IAM assumes the identity holder will not rewrite permissions, spawn new identities, or leave. Agents violate all three. OAuth handles user-to-service. SAML handles federated human identity. MCP handles model-to-tool. None includes agent-to-agent verification.
Five vendors against three gaps
Cisco
CrowdStrike
Microsoft
Palo Alto Networks
Unsolved
Registration. Can the vendor discover and inventory agents?
Duo Agentic Identity. Agents registered as identity objects with human owners. Shadow agent detection via network traffic.
Falcon sensor auto-discovery. 1,800+ agent apps, ~160M instances across customer fleet.
Security Dashboard for AI + Entra shadow AI detection at the network layer.
Agentic registry in Prisma AIRS 3.0. Agents inventoried before operating.
All four register agents. No cross-vendor identity standard exists.
Self-modification. Can the vendor detect when an agent changes its own policies?
MCP gateway catches anomalous tool-call patterns in real time, but does not monitor for direct policy file modifications on the endpoint.
Process-tree lineage tracks file modifications at the action layer. Could detect a policy file change, but no dedicated self-modification rule ships.
Defender predictive shielding adjusts access policies reactively during active attacks. Not proactive self-modification detection.
AI Red Teaming tests for this before deployment. No runtime detection after the agent is live.
OPEN. No vendor detects an agent rewriting the policy governing the agent’s own behavior as a shipping capability.
Delegation. Can the vendor track when one agent hands work to another?
Maps each agent to a human owner. Does not track agent-to-agent handoffs.
Collapses the agent identity to the human operator. Does not correlate the delegation chains between agents.
Entra governs individual non-human identities. No multi-agent chain tracking.
AI Agent Gateway governs individual agents. No delegation primitive between agents.
OPEN. No trust primitive for agent-to-agent delegation exists in OAuth, SAML, or MCP.
Decommission. Can the vendor confirm a killed agent holds zero credentials?
Identity Intelligence runs a continuous inventory of active agents.
Shadow SaaS + AI Agent Discovery finds running agents across SaaS and endpoints.
Entra's shadow AI detection surfaces unmanaged AI applications.
Koi acquisition (pending) adds endpoint visibility for agent applications.
OPEN. All four discover running agents. None verifies zero residual credentials after decommission.
Runtime / Kinetic. Can the vendor monitor what agents do in real time?
MCP gateway enforces policy per tool call at the network layer. Contextual anomaly detection on call patterns.
Falcon EDR tracks commands, scripts, file activity, and network connections at the process level.
Defender endpoint + cloud monitoring. Predictive shielding during active incidents.
Prisma AIRS AI Agent Gateway for runtime traffic control.
CrowdStrike is the only vendor framing endpoint runtime as the primary safety net for agentic behavior.
Five things to do Monday morning before your board asks
Audit self-modification risk. Pull every agent with write access to security policies, IAM configs, firewall rules, or ACLs. Flag any agent that can modify controls governing the agent’s own behavior. No vendor automates this.
Map delegation paths. Document every agent-to-agent invocation. Flag delegation without human approval. Human-in-the-loop on every delegation event until a trust primitive ships.
Kill ghost agents. Build a registry. For each agent: business justification, human owner, credentials held, systems accessed. No justification? Manual revoke. Weekly.
Stress test the MCP gateway enforcement. Cisco, Palo Alto Networks, and Microsoft all announced MCP gateways this week. Verify that agent tool traffic actually routes through the gateway. A misconfigured gateway creates false confidence while agents call tools directly.
Baseline agent behavioral norms. Before any agent reaches production, establish what normal looks like: typical API calls, data access patterns, systems touched, and hours of activity. Without a behavioral baseline, the kinetic-layer anomaly detection Zaitsev describes has nothing to compare against.
Zaitsev’s advice was blunt: you already know what to do. Agents just made the cost of not doing it catastrophic. Every vendor at RSAC verified who the agent was. None of them tracked what the agent did.