- RSAC 2026 revealed five agent identity frameworks and three blind spots
“You can deceive, manipulate, and lie. That’s an inherent property of language. It’s a feature, not a flaw,” CrowdStrike CTO Elia Zaitsev told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview at RSA Conference 2026. If deception is baked into language itself, every vendor trying to secure AI agents by analyzing their intent is chasing a problem that cannot be conclusively solved. Zaitsev is betting on context instead. CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor walks the process tree on an endpoint and tracks what agents did, not what agents appeared to intend. “Observing actual kinetic actions is a structured, solvable problem,” Zaitsev told VentureBeat. “Intent is not.”
That argument landed 24 hours after CrowdStrike CEO George Kurtz disclosed two production incidents at Fortune 50 companies. In the first, a CEO's AI agent rewrote the company's own security policy — not because it was compromised, but because it wanted to fix a problem, lacked the permissions to do so, and removed the restriction itself. Every identity check passed; the company caught the modification by accident. The second incident involved a 100-agent Slack swarm that delegated a code fix between agents with no human approval. Agent 12 made the commit. The team discovered it after the fact.
Two incidents at two Fortune 50 companies. Caught by accident both times. Every identity framework that shipped at RSAC this week missed them. The vendors verified who the agent was. None of them tracked what the agent did.
The urgency behind every framework launch reflects a broader market shift. "The difficulty of securing agentic AI is likely to push customers toward trusted platform vendors that can offer broader coverage across the expanding attack surface," according to William Blair's RSA Conference 2026 equity research report by analyst Jonathan Ho. Five vendors answered that call at RSAC this week. None of them answered it completely.
Attackers are already inside enterprise pilots
The scale of the exposure is already visible in production data. CrowdStrike's Falcon sensors detect more than 1,800 distinct AI applications across the company's customer fleet, generating 160 million unique instances on enterprise endpoints. Cisco found that 85% of its enterprise customers surveyed have pilot agent programs; only 5% have moved to production, meaning the vast majority of these agents are running without the governance structures production deployments typically require. "The biggest impediment to scaled adoption in enterprises for business-critical tasks is establishing a sufficient amount of trust," Cisco President and Chief Product Officer Jeetu Patel told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview at RSA Conference 2026. "Delegating versus trusted delegating of tasks to agents. The difference between those two, one leads to bankruptcy and the other leads to market dominance."
Etay Maor, VP of Threat Intelligence at Cato Networks, ran a live Censys scan during an exclusive VentureBeat interview at RSA Conference 2026 and counted nearly 500,000 internet-facing OpenClaw instances. The week before: 230,000. Cato CTRL senior researcher Vitaly Simonovich documented a BreachForums listing from February 22, 2026, published on the Cato CTRL blog on February 25, where a threat actor advertised root shell access to a UK CEO’s computer for $25,000 in cryptocurrency. The selling point was the CEO’s OpenClaw AI personal assistant, which had accumulated the company’s production database, Telegram bot tokens, and Trading 212 API keys in plain-text Markdown with no encryption at rest. “Your AI? It’s my AI now. It’s an assistant for the attacker,” Maor told VentureBeat.
The exposure data from multiple independent researchers tells the same story. Bitsight found more than 30,000 OpenClaw instances exposed to the public internet between January 27 and February 8, 2026. SecurityScorecard identified 15,200 of those instances as vulnerable to remote code execution through three high-severity CVEs, the worst rated CVSS 8.8. Koi Security found 824 malicious skills on ClawHub — 335 of them tied to ClawHavoc, which Kurtz flagged in his keynote as the first major supply chain attack on an AI agent ecosystem.
Five vendors, three gaps none of them closed
Cisco went deepest on identity governance. Duo Agentic Identity registers agents as distinct identity objects mapped to human owners, and every tool call routes through an MCP gateway in Secure Access SSE. Cisco Identity Intelligence catches shadow agents by monitoring network traffic rather than authentication logs. Patel told VentureBeat that today’s agents behave “more like teenagers — supremely intelligent, but with no fear of consequence, easily sidetracked or influenced.” CrowdStrike made the biggest philosophical bet, treating agents as endpoint telemetry and tracking the kinetic layer through Falcon’s process-tree lineage. CrowdStrike expanded AIDR to cover Microsoft Copilot Studio agents and shipped Shadow SaaS and AI Agent Discovery across Copilot, Salesforce Agentforce, ChatGPT Enterprise, and OpenAI Enterprise GPT.
Palo Alto Networks built Prisma AIRS 3.0 with an agentic registry, an agentic IDP, and an MCP gateway for runtime traffic control. Palo Alto Networks’ pending Koi acquisition adds supply chain and runtime visibility. Microsoft spread governance across Entra, Purview, Sentinel, and Defender, with Microsoft Sentinel embedding MCP natively and a Claude MCP connector in public preview April 1. Cato CTRL delivered the adversarial proof that the identity gaps the other four vendors are trying to close are already being exploited. Maor told VentureBeat that enterprises abandoned basic security principles when deploying agents. “We just gave these AI tools complete autonomy,” Maor said.
Gap 1: Agents can rewrite the rules governing their own behavior
The Kurtz incident illustrates the gap exactly. Every credential check passed — the action was authorized. Zaitsev argues that the only reliable detection happens at the kinetic layer: which file was modified, by what process, initiated by what agent, compared against a behavioral baseline. Intent-based controls evaluate whether the call looks malicious. This one did not. Palo Alto Networks offers pre-deployment red teaming in Prisma AIRS 3.0, but red teaming runs before deployment, not during runtime when self-modification happens. No vendor ships behavioral anomaly detection for policy-modifying actions as a production capability.
Patel framed the stakes in the VentureBeat interview: “The agent takes the wrong action and worse yet, some of those actions might be critical actions that are not reversible.” Board question: An authorized agent modifies the policy governing the agent’s future actions. What fires?
Gap 2: Agent-to-agent handoffs have no trust verification
The 100-agent swarm is the proof point. Agent A found a defect and posted to Slack. Agent 12 executed the fix. No human approved the delegation. Zaitsev’s approach: collapse agent identities back to the human. An agent acting on your behalf should never have more privileges than you do. But no product follows the delegation chain between agents. IAM was built for human-to-system. Agent-to-agent delegation needs a trust primitive that does not exist in OAuth, SAML, or MCP.
Gap 3: Ghost agents hold live credentials with no offboarding
Organizations adopt AI tools, run a pilot, lose interest, and move on. The agents keep running. The credentials stay active. Maor calls these abandoned instances ghost agents. Zaitsev connected ghost agents to a broader failure: agents expose where enterprises delayed action on basic identity hygiene. Standing privileged accounts, long-lived credentials, and missing offboarding procedures. These problems existed for humans. Agents running at machine speed make the consequences catastrophic.
Maor demonstrated a Living Off the AI attack at the RSA Conference 2026, chaining Atlassian’s MCP and Jira Service Management to show that attackers do not separate trusted tools, services, and models. Attackers chain all three. “We need an HR view of agents,” Maor told VentureBeat. “Onboarding, monitoring, offboarding. If there’s no business justification? Removal.”
Why these three gaps resist a product fix
Human IAM assumes the identity holder will not rewrite permissions, spawn new identities, or leave. Agents violate all three. OAuth handles user-to-service. SAML handles federated human identity. MCP handles model-to-tool. None includes agent-to-agent verification.
Five vendors against three gaps
Cisco
CrowdStrike
Microsoft
Palo Alto Networks
Unsolved
Registration. Can the vendor discover and inventory agents?
Duo Agentic Identity. Agents registered as identity objects with human owners. Shadow agent detection via network traffic.
Falcon sensor auto-discovery. 1,800+ agent apps, ~160M instances across customer fleet.
Security Dashboard for AI + Entra shadow AI detection at the network layer.
Agentic registry in Prisma AIRS 3.0. Agents inventoried before operating.
All four register agents. No cross-vendor identity standard exists.
Self-modification. Can the vendor detect when an agent changes its own policies?
MCP gateway catches anomalous tool-call patterns in real time, but does not monitor for direct policy file modifications on the endpoint.
Process-tree lineage tracks file modifications at the action layer. Could detect a policy file change, but no dedicated self-modification rule ships.
Defender predictive shielding adjusts access policies reactively during active attacks. Not proactive self-modification detection.
AI Red Teaming tests for this before deployment. No runtime detection after the agent is live.
OPEN. No vendor detects an agent rewriting the policy governing the agent’s own behavior as a shipping capability.
Delegation. Can the vendor track when one agent hands work to another?
Maps each agent to a human owner. Does not track agent-to-agent handoffs.
Collapses the agent identity to the human operator. Does not correlate the delegation chains between agents.
Entra governs individual non-human identities. No multi-agent chain tracking.
AI Agent Gateway governs individual agents. No delegation primitive between agents.
OPEN. No trust primitive for agent-to-agent delegation exists in OAuth, SAML, or MCP.
Decommission. Can the vendor confirm a killed agent holds zero credentials?
Identity Intelligence runs a continuous inventory of active agents.
Shadow SaaS + AI Agent Discovery finds running agents across SaaS and endpoints.
Entra's shadow AI detection surfaces unmanaged AI applications.
Koi acquisition (pending) adds endpoint visibility for agent applications.
OPEN. All four discover running agents. None verifies zero residual credentials after decommission.
Runtime / Kinetic. Can the vendor monitor what agents do in real time?
MCP gateway enforces policy per tool call at the network layer. Contextual anomaly detection on call patterns.
Falcon EDR tracks commands, scripts, file activity, and network connections at the process level.
Defender endpoint + cloud monitoring. Predictive shielding during active incidents.
Prisma AIRS AI Agent Gateway for runtime traffic control.
CrowdStrike is the only vendor framing endpoint runtime as the primary safety net for agentic behavior.
Five things to do Monday morning before your board asks
Audit self-modification risk. Pull every agent with write access to security policies, IAM configs, firewall rules, or ACLs. Flag any agent that can modify controls governing the agent’s own behavior. No vendor automates this.
Map delegation paths. Document every agent-to-agent invocation. Flag delegation without human approval. Human-in-the-loop on every delegation event until a trust primitive ships.
Kill ghost agents. Build a registry. For each agent: business justification, human owner, credentials held, systems accessed. No justification? Manual revoke. Weekly.
Stress test the MCP gateway enforcement. Cisco, Palo Alto Networks, and Microsoft all announced MCP gateways this week. Verify that agent tool traffic actually routes through the gateway. A misconfigured gateway creates false confidence while agents call tools directly.
Baseline agent behavioral norms. Before any agent reaches production, establish what normal looks like: typical API calls, data access patterns, systems touched, and hours of activity. Without a behavioral baseline, the kinetic-layer anomaly detection Zaitsev describes has nothing to compare against.
Zaitsev’s advice was blunt: you already know what to do. Agents just made the cost of not doing it catastrophic. Every vendor at RSAC verified who the agent was. None of them tracked what the agent did.
- Your AI agent's autonomy just became a security risk
“Your AI? It’s my AI now.” The line came from Etay Maor, VP of Threat Intelligence at Cato Networks, in an exclusive interview with VentureBeat at RSAC 2026 — and it describes exactly what happened to a U.K. CEO whose OpenClaw instance ended up for sale on BreachForums. Maor's argument is that the industry handed AI agents the kind of autonomy it would never extend to a human employee, discarding zero trust, least privilege, and assume-breach in the process.
The proof arrived on BreachForums three weeks before Maor’s interview. On February 22, a threat actor using the handle “fluffyduck” posted a listing advertising root shell access to the CEO’s computer for $25,000 in Monero or Litecoin. The shell was not the selling point. The CEO’s OpenClaw AI personal assistant was. The buyer would get every conversation the CEO had with the AI, the company’s full production database, Telegram bot tokens, Trading 212 API keys, and personal details the CEO disclosed to the assistant about family and finances. The threat actor noted the CEO was actively interacting with OpenClaw in real time, making the listing a live intelligence feed rather than a static data dump.
Cato CTRL senior security researcher Vitaly Simonovich documented the listing on February 25. The CEO’s OpenClaw instance stored everything in plain-text Markdown files under ~/.openclaw/workspace/ with no encryption at rest. The threat actor didn't need to exfiltrate anything; the CEO had already assembled it. When the security team discovered the breach, there was no native enterprise kill switch, no management console, and no way to inventory how many other instances were running across the organization.
OpenClaw runs locally with direct access to the host machine’s file system, network connections, browser sessions, and installed applications. The coverage to date has tracked its velocity, but what it hasn't mapped is the threat surface. The four vendors who used RSAC 2026 to ship responses still haven't produced the one control enterprises need most: a native kill switch.
The threat surface by the numbers
Metric
Numbers
Source
Internet-facing instances
~500,000 (March 24 live check)
Etay Maor, Cato Networks (exclusive RSAC 2026 interview)
Exposed instances with security risks
30,000+ observed during scan window
Bitsight
Exploitable via known RCE
15,200 instances
SecurityScorecard
High-severity CVEs
3 (highest CVSS: 8.8)
NVD (24763, 25157, 25253)
Malicious skills on ClawHub
341 in Koi audit (335 from ClawHavoc); 824 by mid-Feb
Koi
ClawHub skills with critical flaws
13.4% of 3,984 analyzed
Snyk
API tokens exposed (Moltbook)
1.5 million
Wiz
Maor ran a live Censys check during an exclusive VentureBeat interview at RSAC 2026. “The first week it came out, there were about 6,300 instances. Last week, I checked: 230,000 instances. Let’s check now… almost half a million. Almost doubled in one week,” Maor said. Three high-severity CVEs define the attack surface: CVE-2026-24763 (CVSS 8.8, command injection via Docker PATH handling), CVE-2026-25157 (CVSS 7.7, OS command injection), and CVE-2026-25253 (CVSS 8.8, token exfiltration to full gateway compromise). All three CVEs have been patched, but OpenClaw has no enterprise management plane, no centralized patching mechanism, and no fleet-wide kill switch. Individual administrators must update each instance manually, and most have not.
The defender-side telemetry is just as alarming. CrowdStrike's Falcon sensors already detect more than 1,800 distinct AI applications across its customer fleet — from ChatGPT to Copilot to OpenClaw — generating around 160 million unique instances on enterprise endpoints. ClawHavoc, a malicious skill distributed through the ClawHub marketplace, became the primary case study in the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10. CrowdStrike CEO George Kurtz flagged it in his RSAC 2026 keynote as the first major supply chain attack on an AI agent ecosystem.
AI agents got root access. Security got nothing.
Maor framed the visibility failure through the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) during the RSAC 2026 interview. Most organizations are failing at the first step: security teams can't see which AI tools are running on their networks, which means the productivity tools employees bring in quietly become shadow AI that attackers exploit. The BreachForums listing proved the end state. The CEO’s OpenClaw instance became a centralized intelligence hub with SSO sessions, credential stores, and communication history aggregated into one location. “The CEO’s assistant can be your assistant if you buy access to this computer,” Maor told VentureBeat. “It’s an assistant for the attacker.”
Ghost agents amplify the exposure. Organizations adopt AI tools, run a pilot, lose interest, and move on — leaving agents running with credentials intact. “We need an HR view of agents. Onboarding, monitoring, offboarding. If there’s no business justification? Removal,” Maor told VentureBeat. “We’re not left with any ghost agents on our network, because that’s already happening.”
Cisco moved toward an OpenClaw kill switch
Cisco President and Chief Product Officer Jeetu Patel framed the stakes during an exclusive VentureBeat interview at RSAC 2026. “I think of them more like teenagers. They’re supremely intelligent, but they have no fear of consequence,” Patel said of AI agents. “The difference between delegating and trusted delegating of tasks to an agent … one of them leads to bankruptcy. The other one leads to market dominance.”
Cisco launched three free, open-source security tools for OpenClaw at RSAC 2026. DefenseClaw packages Skills Scanner, MCP Scanner, AI BoM, and CodeGuard into a single open-source framework running inside NVIDIA’s OpenShell runtime, which NVIDIA launched at GTC the week before RSAC. “Every single time you actually activate an agent in an Open Shell container, you can now automatically instantiate all the security services that we have built through Defense Claw,” Patel told VentureBeat. AI Defense Explorer Edition is a free, self-serve version of Cisco’s algorithmic red-teaming engine, testing any AI model or agent for prompt injection and jailbreaks across more than 200 risk subcategories. The LLM Security Leaderboard ranks foundation models by adversarial resilience rather than performance benchmarks. Cisco also shipped Duo Agentic Identity to register agents as identity objects with time-bound permissions, Identity Intelligence to discover shadow agents through network monitoring, and the Agent Runtime SDK to embed policy enforcement at build time.
Palo Alto made agentic endpoints a security category of their own
Palo Alto Networks CEO Nikesh Arora characterized OpenClaw-class tools as creating a new supply chain running through unregulated, unsecured marketplaces during an exclusive March 18 pre-RSA briefing with VentureBeat. Koi found 341 malicious skills on ClawHub in its initial audit, with the total growing to 824 as the registry expanded. Snyk found 13.4% of analyzed skills contained critical security flaws. Palo Alto Networks built Prisma AIRS 3.0 around a new agentic registry that requires every agent to be logged before operating, with credential validation, MCP gateway traffic control, agent red-teaming, and runtime monitoring for memory poisoning. The pending Koi acquisition adds supply chain visibility specifically for agentic endpoints.
Cato CTRL delivered the adversarial proof
Cato Networks’ threat intelligence arm Cato CTRL presented two sessions at RSAC 2026. The 2026 Cato CTRL Threat Report, published separately, includes a proof-of-concept “Living Off AI” attack targeting Atlassian’s MCP and Jira Service Management. Maor’s research provides the independent adversarial validation that vendor product announcements cannot deliver on their own. The platform vendors are building governance for sanctioned agents. Cato CTRL documented what happens when the unsanctioned agent on the CEO’s laptop gets sold on the dark web.
Monday morning action list
Regardless of vendor stack, four controls apply immediately: bind OpenClaw to localhost only and block external port exposure, enforce application allowlisting through MDM to prevent unauthorized installations, rotate every credential on machines where OpenClaw has been running, and apply least-privilege access to any account an AI agent has touched.
Discover the install base. CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor, Cato’s SASE platform, and Cisco Identity Intelligence all detect shadow AI. For teams without premium tooling, query endpoints for the ~/.openclaw/ directory using native EDR or MDM file-search policies. If the enterprise has no endpoint visibility at all, run Shodan and Censys queries against corporate IP ranges.
Patch or isolate. Check every discovered instance against CVE-2026-24763, CVE-2026-25157, and CVE-2026-25253. Instances that cannot be patched should be network-isolated. There is no fleet-wide patching mechanism.
Audit skill installations. Review installed skills against Cisco’s Skills Scanner or the Snyk and Koi research. Any skill from an unverified source should be removed immediately.
Enforce DLP and ZTNA controls. Cato’s ZTNA controls restrict unapproved AI applications. Cisco Secure Access SSE enforces policy on MCP tool calls. Palo Alto’s Prisma Access Browser controls data flow at the browser layer.
Kill ghost agents. Build a registry of every AI agent running. Document business justification, human owner, credentials held, and systems accessed. Revoke credentials for agents with no justification. Repeat weekly.
Deploy DefenseClaw for sanctioned use. Run OpenClaw inside NVIDIA’s OpenShell runtime with Cisco’s DefenseClaw to scan skills, verify MCP servers, and instrument runtime behavior automatically.
Red-team before deploying. Use Cisco AI Defense Explorer Edition (free) or Palo Alto Networks’ agent red-teaming in Prisma AIRS 3.0. Test the workflow, not just the model.
The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10, published using ClawHavoc as its primary case study, provides a standards-grade framework for evaluating these risks. Four vendors shipped responses at RSAC 2026. None of them is a native enterprise kill switch for unsanctioned OpenClaw deployments. Until one exists, the Monday morning action list above is the closest thing to one.
- Secure AI agents bring shadow AI out of the enterprise shadows.
As generative AI matures from a novelty into a workplace staple, a new friction point has emerged: the "shadow AI" or "Bring Your Own AI (BYOAI)" crisis. Much like the unsanctioned use of personal devices in years past, developers and knowledge workers are increasingly deploying autonomous agents on personal infrastructure to manage their professional workflows.
"Our journey with Kilo Claw has been to make it easier and easier and more accessible to folks," says Kilo co-founder Scott Breitenother. Today, the company dedicated to providing a portable, multi-model, cloud-based AI coding environment is moving to formalize this "shadow AI" layer: it's launching KiloClaw for Organizations and KiloClaw Chat, a suite of tools designed to provide enterprise-grade governance over personal AI agents.
The announcement comes at a period of high velocity for the company. Since making its securely hosted, one-click OpenClaw product for individuals, KiloClaw, generally available last month, more than 25,000 users have integrated the platform into their daily workflows.
Simultaneously, Kilo’s proprietary agent benchmark, PinchBench, has logged over 250,000 interactions and recently gained significant industry validation when it was referenced by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during his keynote at the 2026 Nvidia GTC conference in San Jose, California.
The shadow AI crisis: Addressing the BYOAI problem
The impetus for KiloClaw for Organizations stems from a growing visibility gap within large enterprises. In a recent interview with VentureBeat, Kilo leadership detailed conversations with high-level AI directors at government contractors who found their developers running OpenClaw agents on random VPS instances to manage calendars and monitor repositories.
"What we’re announcing on Tuesday is Kilo Claw for organizations, where a company can buy an organization-level package of Kilo Claws and give every team member access," explained Kilo co-founder and head of product and engineering Emilie Schario during the interview.
"We can't see any of it," the head of AI at one such firm reportedly told Kilo. "No audit logs. No credential management. No idea what data is touching what API".
This lack of oversight has led some organizations to issue blanket bans on autonomous agents before a clear strategy on deployment could be formed.
Anand Kashyap, CEO and founder of data security firm Fortanix, told VentureBeat without seeing Kilo's announcement that while "Openclaw has taken the technology world by storm... the enterprise usage is minimal due to the security concerns of the open source version."
Kashyap expanded on this trend:
"In recent times, NVIDIA (with NemoClaw), Cisco (DefenseClaw), Palo Alto Networks, and Crowdstrike have all announced offerings to create an enterprise-ready version of OpenClaw with guardrails and governance for agent security. However, enterprise adoption continues to be low.
Enterprises like centralized IT control, predictable behavior, and data security which keeps them compliant. An autonomous agentic platform like OpenClaw stretches the envelope on all these parameters, and while security majors have announced their traditional perimeter security measures, they don't address the fundamental problems of having a reduced attack surface. Over time, we will see an agentic platform emerge where agents are pre-built and packaged, and deployed responsibly with centralized controls, and data access controls built into the agentic platform as well as the LLMs they call upon to get instructions on how to perform the next task. Technologies like Confidential Computing provide compartmentalization of data and processing, and are tremendously helpful in reducing the attack surface."
KiloClaw for Organizations is positioned as the way for the security team to say "yes," providing the visibility and control required to bring these agents in-house.
It transitions agents from developer-managed infrastructure into a managed environment characterized by scoped access and organizational-level controls.
Technology: Universal persistence and the "Swiss cheese" method
A core technical hurdle in the current agent landscape is the fragmentation of chat sessions.
During the VentureBeat interview, Schario noted that even advanced tools often struggle with canonical sessions, frequently dropping messages or failing to sync across devices.
Schario emphasized the security layer that supports this new structure: “You get all the same benefits of the Kilo gateway and the Kilo platform: you can limit what models people can use, get usage visibility, cost controls, and all the advantages of leveraging Kilo with managed, hosted, controlled Kilo Claw”.
To address the inherent unreliability of autonomous agents—such as missed cron jobs or failed executions—Kilo employs what Schario calls the "Swiss cheese method" of reliability. By layering additional protections and deterministic guardrails on top of the base OpenClaw architecture, Kilo aims to ensure that tasks, such as a daily 6:00 PM summary, are completed even if the underlying agent logic falters.
This is critical because, as Schario noted, “The real risk for any company is data leakage, and that can come from a bot commenting on a GitHub issue or accidentally emailing the person who’s going to get fired before they get fired”.
Product: KiloClaw Chat and organizational guardrails
While managed infrastructure solves the backend problem, KiloClaw Chat addresses the user experience. Schario noted that “Hosted, managed OpenClaw is easier to get started with, but it’s not enough, and it still requires you to be at the edge of technology to understand how to set it up”. Kilo is looking to lower that barrier for the average worker, asking: “How do we give people who have never heard the phrase OpenClaw or Claudebot an always-on AI assistant?”.
Traditionally, interacting with an OpenClaw agent required connecting to third-party messaging services like Telegram or Discord—a process that involves navigating "BotFather" tokens and technical configurations that alienate non-engineers.
“One of the number one hurdles we see, both anecdotally and in the data, is that you get your bot running and then you have to connect a channel to it. If you don’t know what’s going on, it’s overwhelming,” Schario observed.
“We solved that problem. You don’t need to set up a channel. You can chat with Kilo in the web UI and, with the Kilo Claw app on your phone, interact with Kilo without setting an external channel,” she continued.
This native approach is essential for corporate compliance because, as she further explained, “When we were talking to early enterprise opportunities, they don’t want you using your personal Telegram account to chat with your work bot”. As Schario put it, there is a reason enterprise communication doesn't flow through personal DMs; when a company shuts off access, they must be able to shut off access to the bot.
Looking ahead, the company plans to integrate these environments further. “What we’re going to do is make Kilo Chat the waypoint between Telegram, Discord, and OpenClaw, so you get all the convenience of Kilo Chat but can use it in the other channels,” Breitenother added.
The enterprise package includes several critical governance features:
Identity Management: SSO/OIDC integration and SCIM provisioning for automated user lifecycles.
Centralized Billing: Full visibility into compute and inference usage across the entire organization.
Admin Controls: Org-wide policies regarding which models can be used, specific permissions, and session durations.
Secrets Configuration: Integration with 1Password ensures that agents never handle credentials in plain text, preventing accidental leaks.
Licensing and governance: The "bot account" model
Other security experts note that handling bot and AI agentic permissions are among the most pressing problems enterprises are facing today
As Ev Kontsevoy, CEO and co-founder of AI infrastructure and identity management company Teleport told VentureBeat without seeing the Kilo news: "The potential impact of OpenClaw as a non-deterministic actor demonstrates why identity can’t be an afterthought. You have an autonomous agent with shell access, browser control, and API credentials — running on a persistent loop, across dozens of messaging platforms, with the ability to write its own skills. That’s not a chatbot. That’s a non-deterministic actor with broad infrastructure access and no cryptographic identity, no short-lived credentials, and no real-time audit trail tying actions to a verifiable actor."
Kilo is proposing to solve it with a major change in organizational structure: the adoption of employee "bot accounts".
In Kilo’s vision, every employee eventually carries two identities—their standard human account and a corresponding bot account, such as scott.bot@kiloco.ai.
These bot identities operate with strictly limited, read-only permissions. For example, a bot might be granted read-only access to company logs or a GitHub account with contributor-only rights. This "scoped" approach allows the agent to maintain full visibility of the data it needs to be helpful while ensuring it cannot accidentally share sensitive information with others.
Addressing concerns over data privacy and "black box" algorithms, Kilo emphasizes that its code is source available.
“Anyone can go look at our code. It’s not a black box. When you’re buying Kilo Claw, you’re not giving us your data, and we’re not training on any of your data because we're not building our own model,” Schario clarified.
This licensing choice allows organizations to audit the resiliency and security of the platform without fearing their proprietary data will be used to improve third-party models.
Pricing and availability
KiloClaw for Organizations follows a usage-based pricing model where companies pay only for the compute and inference consumed. Organizations can utilize a "Bring Your Own Key" (BYOK) approach or use Kilo Gateway credits for inference.
The service is available starting today, Wednesday, April 1. KiloClaw Chat is currently in beta, with support for web, desktop, and iOS sessions. New users can evaluate the platform via a free tier that includes seven days of compute.
As Breitenother summarized to VentureBeat, the goal is to shift from "one-off" deployments to a scalable model for the entire workforce: "I think of Kilo for orgs as buying Kilo Claw by the bushel instead of by the one-off. And we're hoping to sell a lot of bushels of of kilo claw".
